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Introduction 
 
The study of history is often mistaken for a static subject bent on the examination 
of fixed events from which can be derived only a singular conclusion. However, 
such a perspective presents a woeful ignorance of the subject itself and the events 
under study. While the matters of the past are most certainly fixed in space, the 
insight and opportunity for engagement presented by these same events are nearly 
limitless in regard to the present and future. To this end, it is beneficial, even vital, 
to pursue at least a general understanding of human history. The story of humankind 
is not typically one of outstanding moral character or wisdom; indeed, there are 
multiple chapters in which general sense and dignity seem to have abandoned our 
race altogether. There exists no greater example than that of the era extending from 
the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, during which the subjugation of 
different ethnic and cultural groups beneath others never was or has been equaled. 
This subjugation was largely the product of the rise in imperialism within the 
European political landscape that characterized the 1800s. Although imperialism 
was hardly a new invention at the time, it was given far greater popularity and 
potential in the wake of the Industrial Revolution around the turn of the nineteenth 
century. The concept of empire building often conjures up images of British India, 
French Algeria, or even the Belgian Congo, but, despite their late arrival to the 
imperial playing field, it was Germany who commanded the world’s third largest 
overseas empire. This empire was responsible for crafting a unique experience of 
occupation for a multitude of ethnic groups on both the African and European 
continents. These experiences, however, were far from isolated, either from each 
other or from other imperial experiences, yet they are often considered in ostracism 
from these other cases. To combat this inclination toward ostracism, it is necessary 
to an examine the unifying themes of violence, imperialism, and genocide within 
the evolution of the German imperial experience from German Southwest Africa 
  
through World War I and up to the conclusion of World War II. By understanding 
the shared trends of empire and genocide, and how each of these cases are uniquely 
German, one can develop a greater understanding of the origins and outcomes of 
imperial violence in order to bring the actions of the National Socialist party out of 
its prolonged ideological isolation and into a global context of implication.  
The path taken to arrive at this question of imperial trends and significance 
was not a straight or narrow one. Instead, I came to this question through many 
shifts and changes in trajectory, focus, perspective, and even major. I initially 
entered my undergraduate research process as a major in English Literature hoping 
to examine the effects of various written works on progress and development within 
the spheres of society, politics, race, environment, and gender by looking at the 
changes enacted by works like Uncle Tom’s Cabin, The Jungle, Silent Spring, and 
Heart of Darkness. As it would happen, I arbitrarily decided to open Joseph 
Conrad’s work first and was struck by the historical implications already at play 
within the short novella. Under the guidance of Dr. Pizzo, I decided to narrow my 
concentration into an examination of exclusively imperial literature in order to work 
with a four-part case study of British, French, German, and Belgian imperialism, 
but by the time I ended my freshman year, I had resolved to abandon the role of 
literature altogether and instead delve further into the historiography of solely 
German imperialism. Upon returning to my research in the spring of my sophomore 
year, I intended to renew my comparison between the genocides of the Herero 
people of Southwest Africa under the Kaiserreich and the Jews of Europe under the 
National Socialists; however, that fall I introduced a third case to my study by 
including the occupation experience of Eastern Europeans during World War I, 
despite the fact that this case did not fall into the category of genocide. 
Nevertheless, each of these cases were prime examples of imperial ventures gone 
terribly awry that serve as a warning for future generations of the dangers and 
sorrows of racist expansionism. 
  
The origins of the term imperialism offer a certain limited insight into the 
nature of its meaning; the word stems from the Latin root in the word imperare, 
meaning to command. This meaning can stretch from the most basic form, 
command of a group, to the more complex and indicative form, command of a 
nation, an idea, a land. Certainly, many European nations of the modern age 
engaged in both levels of imperare on every continent across the globe, Germany 
not the least of which. The simple knowledge of imperialism’s etymology, 
however, is far from sufficient to grasp its origins, characteristics, or aims. 
Imperialism was actually born centuries before Germany ever united under a single 
national banner. In fact, in many ways, imperialism is as old as civilization itself, 
shaped by mankind’s constant desire to expand and accrue wealth and power. This 
selfsame desire has never evaporated from humanity and indeed gained 
considerable traction over the course of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth 
centuries so that by the nineteenth, the powers that be in Europe had come to base 
their international power and influence on the pursuit and acquisition of large and 
profitable overseas holdings. The last decades of the eighteenth century would have 
perhaps the largest impact on the trajectory of the following centuries with the birth 
of the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain. The innovation of the steam engine, 
the mechanization of industry, and the development of the factory system suddenly 
resulted in a rapid increase in demand for raw materials and laborers. Most 
European powers saw fit to pursue this demand in other lands on the backs of other 
peoples, regardless of their interest or consent. Britain, France, Belgium, Germany, 
and multiple other nations carved up the rest of the “uncivilized” world in their 
quest for palm oil, coal, and rubber. By the outbreak of World War I, hardly a 
fraction of Africa remained independently ruled, and huge swaths of Asia and South 
America also remained under the yoke of European imperialism. 
So, what then qualifies imperialism now that its origins as a mode of human 
expansion are understood? Imperialism can be best quantified in terms of 
  
psychological, political, and economic factors. The psychological factors at play 
are most often distilled down to a simple reference to Rudyard Kipling’s poem, 
“The White Man’s Burden,” in which Kipling references the almost divine duty of 
the white man to liberate the rest of the world from its perceived cultural inferiority. 
This racist precept was fueled by the growing popularity of new academic 
disciplines like ethnography, anthropology, and other fields shadowed by racism 
based on Darwin’s concept of competition and natural selection. Under the guise 
of scientific racism, European empires justified their aggressive expansionism as 
an obligation to uplift the “savage hordes” and force European culture, politics, and 
society on them. Working in tandem with this psychological motivator were the 
political elements of nationalism and prestige. By basing a country’s self-worth on 
its ability to conquer other nations, European states became engaged in a patriarchal 
struggle of proving their virility as a marker of national pride and glory. The 
development of nationalism as a tangible term and concept in the early years of the 
nineteenth century was intrinsic to the development of this second factor in 
imperialism. Beforehand, countries were much more preoccupied with the third 
factor of imperialism: economic interests. Although the Industrial Revolution 
added a new facet of demand for raw materials, empires were already highly 
interested in the acquisition of new markets and ports for international trade as well 
as creating settlements in areas where lucrative materials were readily available. 
With the addition of the demands of the Industrial Revolution, expansion took on a 
whole new fervor in an effort to outrace other groups and achieve market 
superiority, thus securing a rich influx of goods and products at a fraction of their 
worth. Each of these factors coalesced to create an environment in which 
imperialism was not just desirable but viewed as nigh on vital for the future of the 
nation. 
The choice to concentrate on German imperialism, despite the fact that the 
German Empire was not the largest on the globe, was made based on the unique 
  
trajectory of German history. To be fair, there is no model of normality against 
which any nation’s history can be measured, but Germany has walked a path that 
diverges so starkly from that of its neighbors, moving from reticent empire-builders 
to genocidal harbingers and finally to peace activists almost within the same 
century, that it stood to reason to ask why. To answer this, the development of 
German imperialism must be analyzed through four primary realities: German 
pathos, radical improvisation, cognizance of their contemporaries, and modern 
industrialization. Each of these factors combined to create a uniquely German 
experience of imperialism. It then became a matter of identifying which cases of 
German imperial history would be addressed and investigated. The Herero 
genocide seemed a logical beginning based on its chronology, characteristics, and 
status as an example of genocide. The occupation of Eastern Europe during World 
War I was the next step due to its position between the two greatest examples of 
genocide committed by Germans, while simultaneously retaining a level of horror 
unprecedented until that point and not sharing its neighbors’ genocidal 
categorization. The final step had to fall upon the years of World War II, in which 
the National Socialists occupied vast swaths of land east of their original border 
and committed unequaled acts of horror and violence. Each of these three cases 
serves to outline the evolution of imperialism within German history so that by 
tracing this development, a conclusion may be drawn that can help point out future 
situations of atrocity and bloodshed before they can denigrate into full on slaughter. 
Through a better understanding of how such horrors originate and progress, 
mankind might better its ability to prevent them rather than remove them. 
To properly consider each case and the historiography that connects them, 
a vast array of secondary literature was consumed. In the early days of this project’s 
evolution, when the question of research still dealt with the role of literature within 
the political sphere, the book first analyzed was that of Swedish author Sven 
Lindqvist. His 1992 work Exterminate All the Brutes: One Man’s Odyssey into the 
  
Heart of Darkness and the Origins of European Genocide was slim in form but 
heavy in content. The author meandered effortlessly from cover to cover in a 
melding of genres and styles: part travelogue, part historical reflection, and part 
creative writing exercise, all the while having been elegantly translated into English 
from his native Swedish. Organized as a series of sections numbering a startling 
one hundred and sixty-nine, Lindqvist uses Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness as 
a literary lens through which he transitions from present day observations of his 
travels across the Saharan desert to analyses of these countries’ colonial pasts, while 
interjecting occasional ruminations on human nature and his own experience with 
the legacies of the lands and people he encountered on his journey. Even aside from 
the unique organization utilized by the author, this book serves as one of the first 
examples of the push to consider the actions of the Holocaust in relation to previous 
instances of genocide on a European scale rather than as an anomaly or a purely 
German phenomenon. Indeed, Lindqvist takes great pains to document not just the 
actions and ideologies of German figures like Georg Gerland and Friedrich Ratzel, 
the latter of whom made the ominous observation that “a people that does not wish 
to share the fate of the dinosaurs must constantly increase its living 
space…territorial expansion is the safest, indeed fundamentally the only real sign 
of the vitality of the nation and the race,” but also the horrors committed by 
Frenchmen Voulet and Chanoine, Belgium’s King Leopold, and the Welsh-
American journalist Henry Morton Stanley.1 Yet the greatest value of Lindqvist’s 
work lies in his final words on section one hundred and sixty-nine in which he 
states, “it is not knowledge we lack. What is missing is the courage to understand 
what we know and draw conclusions.”2 This final thought was the thought that 
                                                 
1 Sven Lindqvist, Exterminate All the Brutes: One Man’s Odyssey into the Heart 
of Darkness and the Origins of European Genocide (New York: The New Press, 
2007), 155. 
2 Lindqvist, Exterminate All the Brutes, 172. 
  
redirected an entire research project and turned it to a new trajectory aimed at 
understanding and challenging preconceived notions of racism, violence, and 
culpability. Rather than merely borrowing from German precedent or 
understanding, my research would turn to contemplate the global consequences of 
these cases. 
The next step came in the form of Shelley Baranowski’s concise analysis of 
Germany’s specific imperial odyssey: Nazi Empire: German Colonialism and 
Imperialism from Bismarck to Hitler. Opening with an observation of German-
Jewish political theorist Hannah Arendt’s coverage of Adolf Eichmann’s 1961 trial, 
Baranowski succinctly dissects the origins and existence of the two competing 
perspectives of Germany’s imperial legacy by stating how “the first focuses on the 
long-term impact of Imperial Germany’s maritime colonialism before the Great 
War, and explores the possible continuities between Imperial German colonial 
practices and the Third Reich…[while a] second and more recently articulated 
position that challenges the first recognizes that ‘Germany,’ be it the Holy Roman 
Empire until its dissolution in 1806, or the Second Empire after 1871, was a 
continental empire well before it ever ventured overseas.”3 Yet Baranowski argues 
that each of these perspectives is limited in their scope by their inability to grasp 
the unifying factors of empire, colonialism, and genocide. Instead, she offers a third 
view that takes into account all the various stressors on German identity from the 
failure of the Teutonic knights through the upheaval of the Reformation and the 
devastation of the Thirty Year’s War, past the debasement of the Napoleonic Wars 
and the failure of the 1848 Revolution, up to the incomplete Unification of 1871, 
and finally the shameful dissolution of the Kaiserreich in the aftermath of the First 
World War. She uses this context to create a narrative that understands the complex 
                                                 
3 Shelley Baranowski, Nazi Empire: German Colonialism and Imperialism from 
Bismarck to Hitler (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 2. 
  
interplay of ambition and dread that characterized German imperialism from 1871 
to 1945. Although Baranowski’s scholarship begins only on the eve of Unification, 
the fact that she takes into consideration all of Germany’s difficult and disparate 
past is telling of the ramifications it has on the present. Throughout the course of 
her work, the author details the evolution of imperialism through this self-
constructed prism, noting how “the perceived ‘failure’ to eliminate social, religious, 
and ethnic divisions at home led increasingly to the demonization of domestic 
‘enemies,’ who appeared to be the agents of foreign foes.”4 By synthesizing such a 
vast body of work with such a unique scope, Baranowski offers a startlingly 
compelling argument behind the origins of imperial violence. 
 Following this trend of long-term contextualization of mass violence is Yale 
University history professor Ben Kiernan’s sobering work Blood and Soil: A World 
History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur. As befitting its 
substantial size, Kiernan’s book is unique for both the chronological length of its 
scope and the global nature of his enquiry. Throughout the course of Blood and 
Soil, Kiernan analyzes no fewer than fifteen separate cases of genocide from the 
dawn of civilization to cases that are still ongoing, including the Herero Genocide 
and the Holocaust, through a lens of four unifying themes: racial competition, 
glorification of agriculture, the need to expand borders, and obsession with the 
precedent set by antiquity. Phrased in such a way, these themes can seem difficult 
to associate, not only with each other but also with the subject of genocide in the 
first place, but Kiernan painstakingly defines and identifies each of the trends 
within each genocidal chapter so as to make note of the fact that “the persistent 
recurrence among genocide perpetrators of ideological obsessions with violent 
ethnic prejudice, whether racial or religious, with cults of antiquity and agriculture, 
and with territorial expansion, reveals possibilities for predicting and hopefully 
                                                 
4 Baranowski, Nazi Empire, 4. 
  
preventing further cases of genocide in the twenty-first century.”5 Therefore, over 
the course of his book, he points out that racism has existed under many guises 
since the dawn of civilization while veneration of agriculture has fluctuated in 
popularity; however, the drive for expansion has always been popular among 
cultures on every continent. The cult of antiquity is perhaps the most difficult trend 
to understand, but Kiernan simply states that each group that has engaged in 
genocidal actions has invoked the image and blessing of a past group from whom 
they claim heritage, whether that lineage is factual or not. In most Western 
societies, this cult often manifests itself as an obsession with the Greek or Roman 
pathos, which can be clearly identified in nearly every European nation’s art, 
architecture, and political design. With such specific trends laid out in each case, 
Kiernan’s work is a one-of-a-kind contribution to the development of genocide 
studies and the push to recognize previously ignored instances of horror. 
 Some of the more recent additions to the scholarship of German-Eastern 
European relations are Dr. Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius’s 2000 installment War Land 
on the Eastern Front: Culture, National Identity, and German Occupation in World 
War I and his 2009 novel The German Myth of the East: 1800 to the Present, in 
which the University of Tennessee-Knoxville professor analyzes the relationship 
between Germany and Eastern Europe in politics, religion, and culture. Both books 
offer a concise synthesis of the German perspective of the East in all its 
contradictory fascination and repulsion, ultimately outlining how this perspective 
has shaped German identity to this day. Opening the latter book with a remark on 
the similarities between the German view of the East and the American myth of 
‘Manifest Destiny,’ Liulevicius articulates the curious nature of the former as an 
almost existential question fraught with the interplay of the East as “both a site of 
                                                 
5 Ben Kiernan, Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination 
from Sparta to Darfur (Harrisonburg: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 40. 
  
the future and its promise and at the same time a location of peril, associated with 
the past.”6 Continuing his examination, the author is also careful to define the terms 
of his title: German, myth, and East. In this book, “German” refers not only to those 
inhabitants of the nation-state but speakers of the language in all parts of the 
continent, while “myth” refers not to a cluster of lies but rather to a complex of 
ideas and hopes. Rather more difficult to understand is the concept of the “East” 
which, for the purposes of this enquiry, defies the confines of geography and instead 
embodies a concept of disorganization and low culture. Building from these 
established principles, Liulevicius outlines three topics for the scope of his work: 
the flexibility of the German myth of the East; the definition of what constituted a 
“German;” and the presence of recurring terms and themes throughout the 
fluctuations of the Eastern myth. Each of these questions is subsequently explored 
throughout the course of Liulevicius’s work, even as he takes great care to reject 
the tired Sonderweg theory of the mid-twentieth century, which argues for the 
inevitability and peculiarity of German history’s march toward National Socialism. 
The Sonderweg theory was first proposed during World War II as a justification for 
German exceptionalism, yet it fails to explain the proposed norm against which 
German history is measured. As such, Liulevicius argues that continuities cannot 
be misconstrued as causations by referring to his three research questions at hand, 
whose answers firmly reject the notion that an extermination of the people of the 
East was a foregone conclusion. 
In 2003, Dr. Claudia Koonz, then professor of history at Duke University 
and one of the preeminent historians on feminism within the Third Reich, published 
her last academic work, The Nazi Conscience, in which she examined the intangible 
construction of the Nazi moral complex. The idea of the National Socialists having 
                                                 
6 Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius, The German Myth of the East: 1800 to Present 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 1. 
  
a system of moral standards to which members were held in strict accordance seems 
to contradict modern stereotypes about bloodthirsty, warmongering, savage Nazis 
who rejected any kind of cultural diversity or freedom of expression. To be sure, 
such rejection is not incorrect, but then, neither is the presence of this moral 
complex despite the stereotype. In an effort to articulate this oft-dismissed layer in 
the full picture of National Socialism, Koonz offers her work as a basis for critique 
by laying out four assumptions upon which the Nazi conscience operates: the life 
of a Volk organic in its life cycle; community values are dependent on their nature 
and environment; outright aggression against “undesirable” populations in 
conquered lands are justified by the advantage to the Volk; and the right of the 
government to void the rights and protections of assimilated citizens were based on 
race. These assumptions cleared the way for the implementation of the Nazis’ 
central ideological principles of the cult of the Volk, phobic racism, and the pursuit 
of Lebensraum, the mythic concept of land destined for German use in the East. 
Yet the bridge between the baseline assumptions and the tenets of National Socialist 
philosophy is the very conscience upon which the latter relied. In short, the Nazi 
conscience relied on glorification of the Volk and its concerns above all else in the 
effort of promoting a strong and healthy community that need not fear foreign 
intervention. To accomplish this, Koonz echoes the vexation of German poet Hans 
Carossa who wrote, “there’s a lot going on here in Germany: we are being 
laundered, purified, scrubbed, disinfected, separated, nordicized, toughened up, 
and, I caught myself almost adding, alienated.”7 Carossa’s fears of alienation were 
directly in tune with the fears of the time in which Nazi propaganda strove to dissect 
German society into a multitude of dichotomies: Aryan or not, Jewish or not, friend 
or not. 
                                                 
7 Claudia Koonz, The Nazi Conscience (The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press: Cambridge, 2003), 69. 
  
 A decade into the new millennium saw the addition of a remarkable new 
body of work to the field of modern historical scholarship. While working as a 
professor of history at Yale University, author Timothy Snyder created this new 
addition, Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin, to investigate the 
ideologies and experiences of Eastern European occupation under both the German 
and Soviet dictators. Snyder’s work is exceptional because of the geographical 
region in which he writes, including not only Eastern Europe but also the eastern 
and western peripheries that make up the occupying forces themselves. As a history 
of political mass violence, this book places its roots firmly in the soil of World War 
I whilst wading through the events that led up to and involved the Second. Indeed, 
Snyder makes the point that this work operates on the observation made evident by 
the First World War that “showed that millions of men would obey orders to fight 
and die, for causes abstract and distant, in the name of homelands that were already 
ceasing to be or only coming into being.”8 In a departure from the more common 
practice of round figures, Snyder represents these men and the victims of their 
violence at complete numerical figures, never rounding them off to clean even 
thousands but rather calculating them down to the individual. This choice 
underlines both his respect for those affected by political mass violence and his 
understanding of the lives represented by those figures. Each tally mark represents 
someone’s son or daughter, mother or father, friend or cousin. Snyder’s resolve to 
symbolize that significance is a testament to the importance of his argument:  
violence, whether stemming from identical or opposite political doctrines, ruins 
lives and lands more effectively than any other factor or event. 
 Study of the Nazi Reich has been a central component of Modern European 
historical study for the last seven decades, with the atrocities of the East often taking 
                                                 
8 Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe between Hitler and Stalin (Basic Books: 
New York, 2010), 1. 
  
a secondary role in relation to the Western Front. Nevertheless, those who did study 
the horrors in the East divided the cadre into three levels of complicity, ranging 
from sadists at one end of the spectrum to dissenters at the other. While historical 
discourse had originally focused on these two extremes, retired professor of history 
Christopher R. Browning’s 1992 book Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 
101 and the Final Solution in Poland was one of the first works to shift the focal 
point to the previously ignored middle group comprised of those who merely went 
through the motions of their orders, neither objecting nor capitalizing on them. Over 
the course of this work, Browning examines the men of Reserve Police Battalions 
101 who, as middle-aged, working-class individuals drafted from Hamburg, were 
their SS superiors’ opposites in every way. Yet despite their contradiction to the 
typical Nazi profile, these men were an accessory to the round-ups, marches, and 
mass shootings that characterized the earliest stage of the Holocaust in the East. To 
make matters worse, several of the men were offered an opportunity to accept other 
roles that did not require murder, but each offer was summarily rejected. To 
determine why any of the perpetrators in the East, SS or otherwise, would become 
willing executioners, Browning proposed a number of reasons, including “wartime 
brutalization, racism, segmentation and routinization of the task, special selection 
of the perpetrators, careerism, obedience to orders, deference to authority, 
ideological indoctrination, and conformity.”9 In the case of Reserve Police 
Battalion 101, however, Browning distilled his argument down to three primary 
factors: vertical, lateral, and environmental pressures. Drawing equally on 
historical as well as psychological research, Browning’s assertion is critical for the 
universality of its application. These pressures are not uniquely German, but rather 
                                                 
9 Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the 
Final Solution in Poland (Harper Perennial: New York, 1992), 159. 
  
uniquely human, and are therefore subject to repetition until such a time as mankind 
acknowledges its darker nature. 
 
Chapter One: The Herero and Nama Genocide 
 
Though distant from Germany both in geography and societal makeup, the lands 
comprised of present-day Namibia were nevertheless brought under German 
occupation in the late nineteenth century and would remain so until the invasion of 
South African troops in 1915 during the First World War. Yet while conquering 
European powers liked to stylize their actions as “discovery” of new territories, 
these lands had in fact been populated for millennia before the coming of European 
explorers by peoples like the Nama and, later, the Herero. The Herero were not the 
original inhabitants of the region of Namibia, nor were they a single people, but 
rather composition of numerous subsets that share a common tongue within the 
Bantu language tree. Most Herero peoples lived as pastoralists, herding cattle, 
sheep, and goats and basing their social hierarchy on the size of one’s herd. 
Contrary to standard Western ideals, the Herero hierarchy was not simply 
patrilineal but operated on the basis of a double descent system, which placed value 
on the mother’s as well as the father’s family lines. In a review of Carlos Laranjo 
Medeiros’s short work on the Herero people’s kinship customs, Alan Barnard 
briefly identifies the aspects discussed in Medeiros’s chapter on kinship as “an 
analysis of the complicated system of relationship terms, together with a description 
of the double descent system, a statement of the rules of incest avoidance, 
preferential marriage and inheritance, and even an account of burial customs as 
these relate to descent group structure.”10 The Nama were likewise a people based 
                                                 
10 Alan Berend, Review of VaKwandu: History, Kinship and Systems of 
Production of an Herero People of South-West Angola, written by Carlos Laranjo 
  
on herding, but their language belonged within the Khoe-Kwadi language group, a 
separate family entirely from the Bantu languages. The establishment of their 
relationship with the Herero peoples was relatively recent, however. The Herero 
did not trickle into present-day Namibia, the traditional homeland of the Nama, 
until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In doing so, the Herero brought 
themselves into contact and eventual conflict with the pre-established people as 
each vied for grazing land and the opportunity to build their respective herds.  With 
the introduction of European imperialists who deigned not to learn the difference 
between the two peoples, however, both the Herero and Nama would share a similar 
fate of exploitation and extermination. 
The terrible commencement of this fate began decades earlier than its 
fulfillment with the calling of the infamous Berlin Conference in the winter of 1884. 
Having unified only thirteen years earlier, Germany had yet to embark on any 
overseas conquests, a reticence that predated unification and was encouraged by 
Otto von Bismarck, Germany’s iconic Iron Chancellor. Previous involvement in 
colonial enterprise was limited to the signing of the 1879 “Friendship Treaty” with 
Samoa and several other European powers, but according to co-authors Julia Hell 
and George Steinmetz, “the conventional date marking the onset of the formal 
German empire is April 24, 1884, when Germany declared Southwest Africa a 
protectorate.”11 Later that year, the Conference for the partition of Africa began 
with representatives from nearly every major and minor Western power and the 
Ottomans in attendance but notably excluded those from any existing or prospective 
African colonies. The conference would outlast the year and continue onto the next, 
                                                 
Medeiros, Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 54, no. 2 (1984): 
110, accessed October 23, 2017, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1159923. 
11 Julia Hell and George Steinmetz, “The Visual Archive of Colonialism: 
Germany and Namibia,” Public Culture 18, no. 48 (2006): accessed April 24, 
2016, http://publicculture.org/articles/view/18/1/the-visual-archive-of-
colonialism-germany-and-nam. 
  
yet, despite its length, A.G. Hopkins, in his review of Bismarck, Europe and Africa, 
remarks on the significance of preeminent scholar S.E. Crowe’s reading of the 
event, stating “there is general agreement…that [the Conference] did not cause 
partition and that Crowe was broadly correct in minimizing its influence.”12 
Nevertheless, the Conference was responsible for marking a sudden shift in public 
opinion concerning colonialism. Despite the claim that such endeavors were in 
favor of commercial expansion, research conducted by Dr. Rempel at Western New 
England College states that “by the 1820s several countries, after having long 
colonial connections, had lost these connections without suffering any apparent 
economic deprivation.”13 Harmut Pogge von Strandmann, however, points out that 
no fewer than six factors in the rise of German overseas aspirations arose in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century, including emigration, increased investment in 
global trade, growth of missionary societies, a fascination with exploring “exotic” 
landscapes, the creation of colonial pressure groups, and the spread of colonial 
propaganda.14 Echoing the argument of Rempel, Joseph A Schumpeter reasoned 
instead that imperialism was driven more by the act of action, for the simple sake 
                                                 
12 A. G. Hopkins, Review of Bismarck, Europe and Africa: The Berlin Africa 
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of being a goal for a nation to accomplish.15 Schumpeter’s strongest argument, 
however, is one that coincides with Yale scholar Kiernan’s pre-established theories 
on genocide: imperialism is an atavism. Just as certain species honor their 
hereditary roots with retentive genes, both imperialism and genocide exhibit 
tendencies to revert back to a preconceived notion of an ancestral precedent. This 
tendency served as one of the largest prompting factors in validating colonial 
ventures abroad. 
With the establishment of Southwest Africa as a German protectorate in 
1884 and the claiming of modern day Tanzania and the Republics of Cameroon and 
Togo by the following year, Germany had established itself as a serious player in 
the realm of colonial enterprise, superseded only by the French and the British in 
scale of conquest. Having created an overseas empire of considerable diversity, the 
German Reich was able to call upon the resources provided by “hunters in the 
Kalahari desert, Nama pastoralists, Ngoni soldiers, Islamic lords in the Sudan, 
Swahili-speaking traders, and many others” to provide the economic gain that 
purportedly accompanied imperialism.16 With the smallest number of indigenous 
people living within the second largest territory under German imperial control, 
alongside the virtual nonexistence of malaria, Southwest Africa appeared to be the 
most ideal location to begin colonizing in earnest. Thus, the invasive acquisition of 
land and resources once occupied by the Herero and Nama peoples began, whose 
lifestyle relied on the freedom to let their herds graze across vast tracts of land. 
Rather than simply seizing the land through brute force, German colonial officials, 
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led first by Heinrich Göring, father of Hermann Göring, then Curt von François, 
and finally by Theodor Leutwein, relied on the strict traditions of Herero kinship 
and their own stereotypical ideas about “tribal” governance to bribe and blackmail 
local Herero leaders into working with the invaders against the best interest of their 
people. One such leader was Samuel Maharero, a man who had been educated in 
local Lutheran schools and initially attempted to maintain peaceful relations with 
the German colonial administration. Maharero was far from the only Herero man 
to receive a Western education, and, indeed, many of the indigenous peoples were 
highly familiar with Western dress, customs, ideals, and technology. Even with this 
knowledge, however, Maharero and plenty of his contemporaries were transformed 
into puppet proxies, while Leutwein and the German officials stripped countless 
Herero clans of their land, committed numerous cases of rape against Herero and 
Nama women and girls, used alcohol as a tool of exploitation, and withheld the 
right to testify in colonial courts. The myriad of indignities compounded to create 
an intense atmosphere of tension and resentment between the German subjugators 
and the subjugated Herero and Nama. 
 Life under German rule was harsh and uncompromising for the indigenous 
population. Their land, which had been virtually stolen from them by intoxicating 
local leaders and forcing their signatures on legal documents in a language they 
could not read, was converted from its original use as grazing territories to mass 
plantations for cotton and other export crops or as building sites for new railroads. 
The indigenous people were then used as cheap labor for the plantations, a direct 
insult to both their humanity and their former way of life. The final blow came in 
the form of a vicious viral infection that ravaged entire herds of cattle and domestic 
buffalo. In hardly any time at all, this rinderpest epidemic destroyed nearly ninety 
percent of the cattle population in the region and thus eliminated the primary source 
of wealth and diet for the Herero and Nama peoples. Having already been 
undermined by the machinations of the German colonists, Herero society was 
  
further weakened by this cattle plague by “forcing large numbers of Hereros off the 
land and into the labor market [while] new warlords such as Kajata and Willy Kain, 
as well as Samuel Maherero, sought to exploit the situation by exporting labor and 
selling land.”17 The loss of their land was, for many Herero and Nama peoples, the 
final blow. Unable to preserve their disease-ridden herds, left without a means to 
pay back the loans they had taken from German settlers at exorbitant interest rates, 
and faced with the prospect of continued rape, forced labor, unlawful 
representation, and betrayal by their own ruling elite, the Herero peoples, led by the 
man who had once contributed to their misery, Samuel Maharero, joined their 
neighbors and rose up in a mass revolt in January of 1904. 
 The initial response of the Herero people to this intolerable environment 
was a desperate attack on a German settlement that ended with the deaths of 
between 120 and 150 colonists. Governor Leutwein, hoping to maintain a 
semblance of peace and order within the protectorate, negotiated the armistice of a 
group of Herero rebels, but, while Leutwein believed the conflict to have been 
resolved and thus withdrew many of his armed forces, Maharero and his followers 
occupied Okahandja and declared independence from the German colony based in 
Windhoek. Now forced to acknowledge that the situation had escalated beyond his 
control, Leutwein sent to Berlin for reinforcements to deal with the uprising in May 
of 1904. By June of that year, these reinforcements had arrived with a new 
commander for the colony, General Lothar von Trotha. Whereas Leutwein had 
favored a policy of surrender for the renegade Herero people, von Trotha 
immediately differentiated himself from his predecessor by articulating his 
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perception of the indigenous peoples as a naturally violent culture and then 
announcing his intention to eradicate the whole of the indigenous population, an 
echo of the passionate request of a Pan-German leaflet some fourteen years earlier 
that called for all Germans to “be a conquering people which takes its portion of 
the world itself!” 18 Just two short months after their arrival in Southwest Africa, 
von Trotha’s forces had defeated the brunt of the Herero fighting force in the Battle 
of Waterberg. Cutting off access to all watering holes in the area, the German 
soldiers drove the survivors into the Omaheke region of the Kalahari Desert, 
ruthlessly cutting down any individuals who fell behind, including women, 
children, and the elderly, despite their being unarmed and unable to offer any 
resistance. Of the thousands who fled the killing ground of Waterberg, less than a 
thousand made it across the desert to British-controlled Bechuanaland, where they 
were offered asylum from the Germans. Most were not so lucky.  
 In October of 1904, von Trotha sealed the doom of the Herero peoples with 
the issuance of his infamous Extermination Order, in which he set a price on the 
head of the Herero elite and promised armed retribution to any Herero who 
attempted to return to his homeland, including women and children, whom he 
promised to “drive…back to their people or let them be shot at.”19 In recent years, 
some historians have attempted to deemphasize the importance of the 
Extermination Order, yet such a proclamation represents indisputable proof of the 
German colonial military’s willingness to employ the most extreme measures 
possible to achieve their goal of living space in Africa. In light of their obsession 
with ancestral precedent, reliance on racial tropes, pursuit of foreign territory, and 
                                                 
18 Mildred S. Wertheimer, “Program of the Pan-German League, 1890-1898,” 
Modern History Sourcebook, accessed April 26, 2016, 
http://legacy.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1890pangerman.asp.  
19 Lothar von Trotha, “Extermination Order,” Canvas, accessed December 20, 
2017, https://murraystate.instructure.com/courses/1252425/assignments/4831433.  
  
exploitation of preexisting economic factors, the German occupation of Southwest 
Africa was a textbook example of Kiernan’s genocidal themes. Although von 
Trotha purportedly intended for his troops to merely shoot over the heads of fleeing 
women and children, co-authors David Olusoga and Casper Erichsen rightly point 
out that for these troops “hundreds of miles from their senior commanders, 
operating on the fringes on an endless desert and under orders to shoot Herero on 
sight, it may well have been a very small step for exhausted men to reinterpret their 
orders as a license to kill all Africans.”20 Most women and children were, in fact, 
spared a death by bullets yet subjected to sexual assault before being turned out into 
the desert to die of starvation and dehydration. In response to these vast cruelties, 
the Nama people joined their former neighbors in rebellion in the same month that 
von Trotha issued his order, yet, by the end of the year, new orders from Berlin had 
come that mandated the removal of “survivors” to newly erected concentration 
camps under German colonial control. 
 The modern concept of the concentration camp, or Konzentrationslager, is 
often given German origins; however, the first such settlement was in fact 
implemented by the British during the Second Boer War during the turn of the 
twentieth century. The first German iteration came less than a year into their 
conflict with Herero, most notably in the form of Shark Island, a miserable, 
windswept mass of rocks just off the coast of Namibia. In this camp, as well as the 
others scattered across the colony, Herero and Nama peoples were crowded into 
squalid barracks where disease, starvation, and exhaustion through work rapidly 
diminished the population. Missionaries of various faiths were even allowed inside 
to proselytize the prisoners on a weekly schedule, despite the purpose of the conflict 
being “to eradicate the Herero as an ethnic group from German South-West Africa, 
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either by their extermination or by their wholesale expulsion from the colony.”21 
Hundreds of prisoners of all ages and sexes were used in systematic studies to 
validate European ideals of racial superiority; German guards put their captives to 
work doing hard physical labor while countless women were pressed into sex 
slavery. These studies were powered by the drive to develop the fields of 
anthropology and ethnography, which at that time served to perpetuate the idea of 
“tribalism” as a way of over simplifying and trivializing the monolithic social 
structure of indigenous peoples. This racist ideology, already prevalent among 
intellectual groups and growing with each passing year, was also rampant among 
the common people, though to a much less precise degree. In his written 
recollections, a German foot soldier named Gustave Freensen documented his 
experiences while on campaign from 1903 to 1904, during which he remarked how 
he “was surprised that so many hard undertakings, of which I had never heard or 
read so much as a word, had been carried through by Germans, and that already so 
much German blood had been lavishly spilled in this hot, barren land.”22 
Underlining the fact that the common German displayed little understanding of his 
environment while maintaining a deeply ingrained complex of blood superiority, 
Freensen’s story is also a chilling tale of brutality against “the enemy,” a brutality 
that Kaiser Wilhelm II praised in his speech to the Reichstag in November of 1905 
in which he proclaimed that “I know that I speak for the German people when I 
warmly thank and proudly acknowledge the officers and troops who answered my 
call and defended our territories with heroic courage at risk to their own lives.”23 
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That “heroic courage” culminated with the extermination of some 65,000 Herero 
and 10,000 Nama people, an eighty percent and fifty percent depopulation, 
respectively.24  
 With the completion of their genocidal goals in 1907, German settlers 
experienced less than a decade of “prosperity,” during which they were permitted 
to use Herero and Nama laborers for work on their plantations and construction 
projects. These laborers were the last survivors of the concentration camps that 
were finally closed in the last year of the conflict. Signifying their status with a 
metal disc worn around the neck, the exploited Herero and Nama peoples were 
forbidden from owning land or cattle and existed only in their role as manual 
workers. While this short era was a time of misery for the indigenous peoples, 
German settlers thrived in such a way that, years after the territory had been lost to 
war and the Treaty of Versailles, later regimes would tap into this nostalgia and 
“the memory of German South-West Africa and the era of the ‘settler paradise’ 
between the Herero and Nama genocides and World War I.”25 The use of this 
nostalgia, in conjunction with the racist tropes employed by the colonial 
administration, would become a powerful tool, particularly in the repertoire of Nazi 
Germany, who would brazenly employ the appropriation of national identity, 
culture, and memory to validate their racial ideology. While the validation of this 
ideology was reliant at least in part on such nostalgia, its implementation was fully 
reliant on the realization of genocide. To this end, historian Shelley Baranowski 
points out that while “the colonial army’s pacification in the name of security at the 
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very least carried genocidal potential…Nazism’s ideological project, the racial 
remaking of its Lebensraum largely unchecked by dissent at home, created its own 
unique agent.”26 This lack of dissent at home was partially mirrored during the 
Kaiserreich by many high-ranking officials like Alfred von Schlieffen and the 
Kaiser himself, even as the SPD vehemently opposed the methods employed by 
von Trotha. The elections that followed the genocide would be marked as the only 
time in German history where the SPD actually lost seats in the Reichstag due to 
their opposition to the Herero and Nama genocide.  
 While Europeans failed to voice sufficient objection to the horrors visited 
on the Herero and Nama peoples, the indigenous populations did not suffer the 
same reticence. With 1915 marking the loss of Southwest Africa from German 
control to the invasion of South Africa under British command, 1919 marked the 
year in which Namibia became a de facto “fifth province” of South Africa. Over 
the following years, South Africa enforced considerable executive authority over 
their mandate territory, even going so far as to introduce apartheid in conjunction 
with the rise of the South African National Party. In response to these increasingly 
authoritarian actions, both the Herero and Nama leadership bodies submitted 
complaints to the United Nations, which went largely unheard until 1988 when 
Namibia finally won her independence. The genocide that had so terribly 
redesigned Namibia’s demographic and cultural landscape had been recognized as 
such by the U.N. only three years earlier. Since that time, relations between 
Germany and Namibia have been strained, as the former avoided issuing a formal 
apology for nearly twenty years after the recognition of the genocide while the latter 
has filed multiple lawsuits demanding reparations and the return of property to 
descendants of the victims. Many of these lawsuits are ongoing still today, while 
others have resulted in compromised compensation and the delayed return of 
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certain relics from German universities.27 Ultimately, the legacy of this genocide 
and the war that surrounded it is one of long-lasting resentment and bureaucratic 
reticence to right the wrongs of the past. By drawing on this example of cultural 
concerns, hurried extemporization, awareness of related events, and industrial 
possibilities at work, the Herero and Nama genocide serves as an outline for later, 
darker realities. 
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Chapter Two: The Ober Ost 
  
Between the Volga River and the Rhine lies a vast stretch of land south of the Baltic 
Sea and north of the Adriatic in which Ivan Berend of Cambridge University has 
observed “similar economic, social, and political structures have established in the 
course of European history a distinct region.”28 This region is home to people from 
an assortment of ethnic groups, the most prominent of which was the Slavic people. 
Although perceived as scattered, divided, and leaderless by their immediate western 
neighbors in the Holy Roman Empire and beyond, the peoples of Eastern Europe, 
particularly in areas of a Slavic majority, were, in fact, already well established and 
economically stable. Nonetheless, much of Central and Eastern Europe was 
inundated with German immigrants during the High Middle Ages under the flag of 
the expanding Teutonic Knights. The introduction of an entirely new ethnic group, 
particularly one that rivaled the preexisting majority, put considerable stress on the 
demographic of Eastern Europe. While German émigrés regarded their movement 
as a fulfillment of Ostsiedlung, their predestined expansion into the East as 
promised and encouraged by the Teutonic Order, many indigenous groups felt 
crowded and were agitated by the influx of new people. For decades, many 
historians regarded this influx as not just a physical movement of people but also a 
movement of ideas, culture, and social structures. While this belief was true to a 
certain degree, Eastern Europe had already established cities, laws, and a rich 
culture of folklore for itself before any German immigrant had crossed their 
borders. Nonetheless, Ostsiedlung did reshape much of the societal structure of the 
region by introducing German town law, in which urban dwellers were granted 
certain property rights, personal freedoms, and trade protections from foreign 
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merchants. Though initially offered only to ethnic Germans, these laws were soon 
expanded to include all inhabitants, regardless of ethnicity. Ethnic identity did not 
dissipate with the inclusion of non-German peoples in the new town law, however. 
Indeed, the relationship between ethnic identity and fervent loyalty to one’s land 
was not foreign to Eastern Europe, but, whereas this relationship had manifested 
itself as nationalism in the West over the course of the nineteenth century, such a 
concept was inherently more difficult to create and convey between the disparate 
peoples of the East, resulting in a disunity that was repeatedly exploited by foreign 
powers in the modern era. In Poland however, a conscious national identity had 
been created in response to this continuous foreign intervention and manipulation, 
so that “to be a Pole…meant to be cognizant of the past, to recognize the existence 
of a community shaped by a common history, culture, language, and faith (or some 
combination of the above).”29 Cognizance of this common community, which 
became characteristic in almost every area of the continent, would become the most 
important societal development in modern Europe. 
 The idea of the common community, linked by shared history, language, 
and culture, was a concept that was rapidly circulating in the late eighteenth century 
during the French Revolution before gaining enormous traction and popularity 
across Europe in reaction to the spread of the First French Empire under Napoleon. 
The term “nationalism” had already been coined in 1772 by Prussian scholar 
Johann Gottfried Herder in his “Treatise on the Origin of Language,” in which he 
emphasized the crucial importance of language in the construction of a national 
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identity and the cognizance of the human spirit.30 Herder expounded on this ideal 
in other works as well, asserting that “the time [is] coming when we shall return in 
earnest to our language, to the merits, to the principles and goals of our fathers and 
learn therefore to value our own gold.”31 Hardly three years after Herder’s death, 
German statesman Johann Fichte called on French-occupied Berlin, and to all 
German-speakers abroad, to distinguish themselves from their geographic 
neighbors in other countries, saying that any country that “wishes to absorb and 
mingle with itself any other people of different descent and language, cannot do so 
without itself becoming confused…and violently disturbing the even progress of 
its culture.”32 In the vein of these early proponents of nationalism were figures like 
Ernst Moritz Arndt and Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl, both of whom were supporters of 
a romanticized German agrarian state in which the rural Volk were viewed as the 
most genuine Germans and thus the personification of the true German spirit. The 
field of ethnography lent itself to the support of nationalist ideals by circulating 
pseudoscientific concepts about race that relied heavily on stereotypes, ignorance, 
and religion-based fears. The interest of German political, philosophical, and 
scholarly figures in the creation of a national identity hearkens back centuries to the 
Thirty Years War of the early seventeenth century, which left a lasting mark on the 
German psyche by instilling an enduring fear of foreign domination and 
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exploitation, as well as a subsequent need for unification and protection. With the 
occupation of the French during the Napoleonic Wars, this centuries-old fear was 
rekindled and finally realized in 1871, largely through the machinations of Prussian 
statesman Otto von Bismarck.  
  Under Bismarck’s nominal rule from Unification to 1890, Germany 
pursued a course of foreign diplomacy characterized by the concepts of realpolitik, 
a pragmatic approach to “real world politics” regardless of ideology, morals, or 
ethics. Concurrent with this diplomatic style was the hope held by many that “the 
new Germany was but the first stage in the achievement of a dominion that would 
extend beyond its present borders to include ethnic Germans scattered throughout 
Europe, a realm that would reach as far as Constantinople and the Black Sea.”33 
Although Bismarck was resistant even to the idea of building an overseas empire, 
he nevertheless agreed to its creation by hosting the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, 
which would ultimately lead to Germany’s short but bloody control of East Africa 
and Southwest Africa. Yet despite Bismarck’s careful construction and 
maintenance of a complex system of treaties, alliances, and agreements with all of 
the major powers and many minor powers in Europe, he was summarily replaced 
by a series of weaker politicians who bowed to the newly crowned Kaiser’s political 
ideations, which included an abrupt shift away from Bismarck’s defensive 
realpolitik in favor of the more aggressive Weltpolitik. Under the Kaiser’s new 
leadership, Germany relentlessly pursued acquisition of overseas territories while 
also adopting a more assertive diplomatic approach to their continental neighbors. 
This pugnacious attitude was undeniably provoked by Germany’s wholehearted 
adherence to the principles of “nationalism, the civic religion of the new state, 
[which] reflected the centrality of military values, as well as an aggressive 
confidence in Germany’s growing industrial power and the conviction that German 
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influence in the world ought to correspond to the country’s economic might.”34 By 
1914, tensions on the continent were brought to a head with the assassination of the 
Austrian archduke by a Serbian nationalist sect. Within weeks of the assassination, 
the complex web of alliances and treaties that had so characterized foreign 
diplomacy for the last several decades were called into action, and Europe was once 
again at war with itself. For the peoples of Eastern Europe, World War I was hardly 
the exciting prospect hailed by the West. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
had not been kind to the region, which had suffered under continued divisions and 
rule by foreign powers while simultaneously upholding the “industrialized, 
urbanized, and educated West…[as] a far away, admired, envied, and hated 
promised land for the agricultural, rural, partly illiterate peasant societies of the 
East.”35 Indeed, while nations like Britain, France, Germany, and Belgium had 
continued to exercise their imperial muscles and enjoy ever-rising prosperity, the 
failure of achieving an equal status in the East resulted in the “extreme ideologies 
and political trends that emerged in turn-of-the-century Central and Eastern 
Europe…all of [which] repudiated the West and rejected the previous imitative road 
of development.”36 Instead, despite being dramatically unprepared for modern 
warfare and ardently wishing to avoid such a conflict, the lands of Eastern Europe, 
particularly Poland, which were ruled at the time by Tsarist Russia, would find 
themselves front and center for the duration of the nearly four-and-a-half-year 
campaign. 
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While World War I is often remembered in the West for its static trench 
borders that never wavered more than a few miles in either direction over the course 
of the war, the border in the East was a different matter altogether. This boundary 
was a fluid line, bulging and shrinking hundreds of miles as the Germans and 
Austro-Hungarians struggled against the Russians and their Eastern European 
holdings. Yet for much of the war, Germany held control of vast swaths of eastern 
territory, each section of which was organized and governed differently; but none 
were governed more ruthlessly than the parts of present-day Lithuania, Latvia, 
Belarus, Poland, and Courland that made up the zone under the control of the 
Oberbefehlshaber, known as the Ober Ost. The Ober Ost, effectively controlled by 
Erich Ludendorff until 1916 and then by the Bavarian Prince Maximilian until the 
end of the war, operated as a formal military occupation that had replaced the 
previous Russian presence while allowing the native Polish administration to 
remain intact, though powerless. Driven by a multitude of motivations ranging from 
militaristic strategy to deeply embedded ideals about eastward expansion, the 
Germans hoped to create a model state in which native Slavs would be elevated to 
the standards of their German occupiers while also making room for German 
immigrants to the East. To prepare the land for its intended purpose, the Germans 
divided the region into three districts, in each of which were implemented two 
policies of occupation identified in Vejas Gabriel Liulevicius’s work The German 
Myth of the East: Verkehrspolitik and Deutsche Arbeit. The policy of 
Verkehrspolitik restricted the movement of the native population between the 
districts and called for forced labor and the expropriation of available resources; 
yet “while Verkehrspolitik controlled the land, borders, and movement, a program 
of Kultur would accomplish the same on the spiritual plane, controlling entire 
  
peoples, their national identities, and future development.”37 Stemming from early 
racial ideologies about Slavic ethnic groups that would provide a later basis for the 
Nazi ethos, the cultural concept of Deutsche Arbeit promoted the purification of 
Eastern societies and cultures through integration with the German model. Toward 
this end, “the army devoted astonishing effort in time of war to cultural 
improvement behind the front: newspapers in native languages, publication of 
dictionaries, folk museums, school regulations, archaeological and historical 
investigations, and theatre.”38  As a result of these conflicting policies and the 
positioning of the Eastern Front, the Ober Ost and much of occupied Poland were 
ravaged over four long years. 
 The reality of German occupation could often be much different than the 
original aims and concepts proposed by the racial narrative of German ideology 
about the East. The term Verkehrspolitik itself is a reference to the ominously 
panoptic possibilities at play; difficult to assign to a single definition in English, the 
root “verkehr” refers to “traffic, movement, communications and relations, or (most 
broadly) any kind of interaction.”39 Such interaction went beyond simply 
determining where the indigenous peoples could and could not go to include the 
acquisition of manufactured resources, the movement of raw materials, and the 
mobilization of troops. By operating under such a broad term, the German military 
acted with the freedom to secure each of these factors while also addressing 
reconstruction efforts and partisan uprisings, all with the ultimate goal of permanent 
ownership of the land via colonialization. Of course, while “many competing 
interests, economic, political, and financial, were to be taken into consideration in 
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forming policies, [sic] the overrising interest in any instance was always the army’s 
demand for security and ‘ordered circumstances.”40 The decisions made in the 
name of this policy were handled by an administrative section of the same name 
and in conjunction with other offices as demanded by the incredibly ambitious 
concerns of the policy. As a result, no section of the Ober Ost’s administrative body 
was spared involvement or fulfillment of Verkehrspolitik. The impact this had on 
the people who had lived in the area now controlled by the Germans was deep and 
lasting, from the creation of fixed resource prices to the drive of Polish laborers to 
German farms in the West, but not altogether unique. Even in the lands of the 
Entente, residents of “enemy origin” were treated with distrust and suspicion in 
ways that often manifested in movement policies that echoed that of the Ober Ost. 
In Scotland at the very start of the war, a German woman, Edith Herring, was 
arrested for traveling outside her permitted five-mile radius, despite her claims that 
she attempted to procure a travel pass. Nevertheless, Herring was arrested and 
sentenced to five days in prison before being sent back to Germany.41 Native 
residents in the Ober Ost were not granted the same treatment, since their enemies 
resided in their own lands. Yet the all-encompassing movement policy was not the 
only occupation strategy employed by the Germans. 
 While Verkehrspolitik was adopted as a means of controlling the movement 
of people, resources, and information in the East, a project of Kultur was employed 
to accomplish the same reordering of the people’s identities. When the German 
army came into possession of their new lands, the overwhelming reaction of the 
German military can be welded into a single descriptive term for the whole region: 
Unkultur, or the lack of any recognizable culture.  This imperious verdict 
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materialized in the Deutsche Arbeit policy and prompted the creation of an ethnic 
missionary cult, which was bent on merging Eastern identity with proper German 
culture to create a new regional self-concept that was reliant on German influence 
and reinforced the narrative of their own racial preeminence. In the works of 
various German writers, including Thomas Mann, the concept of Kultur was 
identified and touted as “an organic, rooted, idealistic, and authentic expression of 
the creative essence of German national character. By contrast, the Latin word 
‘civilization’ stood for artificial, merely technical achievements of a soulless 
western way of life, embodied by the decadent French and the coldly mercantile 
British.”42  In fact, the term Kultur stems from the Latin word colere, meaning to 
cultivate, which brings to mind Kiernan’s genocidal trend of agriculture by 
summoning “the image of the helmeted German soldier sowing in the East.”43  The 
image of the farming soldier representing the best of true German culture would 
only grow to mythic proportions in the decades following World War I. The revival 
of Ostsiedlung, the medieval emigration of Germanic peoples into Eastern Europe, 
was yet another echo of this colonial desire that grew louder with the creation of a 
“demarcation line to the East which coincided largely with the easternmost line 
held by the medieval Teutonic Knights—a coincidence, which gave the more 
romantic among the German officers the feeling of guarding once more the West 
against the East.”44 To this end, the German occupation forces dedicated themselves 
to creating order and cultivation in order to create a positive image of German 
Work, define native identity, and contextualize the meaning of the German 
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presence in the East, so that the Ober Ost would remain a German holding for time 
without end. 
 The interaction of ideology and action is precisely the place in which reality 
and meaning find a common root. While the ideologies fueling the actions taken in 
the Ober Ost were highly reminiscent of those invoked in Southwest Africa, and 
later by the National Socialists, from the near-divinely inspired pursuit of territory 
to the racialized preconceptions toward the indigenous populations, the Ober Ost 
never descended into genocide despite the nominal presence of each of Kiernan’s 
genocidal trends. The obsession with agriculture, fertile soil, and genetic 
predispositions toward cultivation manifests itself in the Ober Ost not only in 
Liulevicius’s image of the soldier-farmer working to “civilize” the “barbaric” East 
for the benefit of all the ethnic Germans living outside the Fatherland, but also in 
Theodore Abel’s account of the farmer’s story, in which the subject recounted how 
“the greater our need became, the more deeply the farmer attached himself to the 
soil. Everyone felt that if he had to leave the soil his life would be destroyed, 
uprooted.”45 Closely related to this obsession, the drive for expansion was evident 
in Germany’s war aims and military strategy that led them to occupy this massive 
territory, just as the concerns of ancestral precedent urged them to redeem lost land 
and legend. Military giants like Ludendorff and Hindenburg were far from the only 
ones in support of this territorial expansion: “as the antidote to the Polish ‘flood’ 
and as the protectors of German communities outside the Reich’s borders 
threatened by ‘Russidication’ or ‘Magyarization,’ the Pan Germans stood at the 
forefront in pushing for the continental consolidation of ethnic Germans in one 
polity.”46 Yet the racism that had dominated interaction between colonists and the 
colonized in the southern hemisphere reappeared in a milder format just a decade 
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later. Roger Chickering admits that “aspects of German rule during the First World 
War did anticipate the Nazi ‘population policy’ of the next war, the attempt to 
reengineer society in the occupied lands according to racial principles;” however, 
the goal of German occupation during World War I was the harnessing of economic 
resources for the good of the civilized Volk.47 Though still disparaging, critical, and 
exploitative, interactions between the German occupiers and the occupied peoples 
was not inherently genocidal or systematically orchestrated to be violent and 
bloody. The very nature of Germany’s occupation was fundamentally different 
from its earlier and later incarnations, as their aim was to elevate the East to German 
standards of culture and society rather than dedicated to the exploitation and 
eventual erasure of the indigenous populations.   
 At the same time that Germany’s military was struggling with their goals of 
cultivating and civilizing the perceived barbarity of the Eastern regions, it was also 
dealing with a war on two fronts that was slowly sapping the country’s life, 
resources, and will to fight. While fighting in the west had ground down to a static 
war of attrition, fighting in the east remained highly intense and mobile until the 
withdrawal of Russia from the conflict. The massive country’s surrender came after 
more than a year of dissatisfaction, mutiny, and political upheaval that finally 
culminated with the infamous October Revolution that saw the ascension of the 
Bolshevik Party to the most powerful institutions in Russia. Though remembered 
today as a singular event of 1917, the Bolshevik Revolution was an uprising that 
took years to fully realize, involving millions of lives from the conscription of the 
Red Army to the effects of widespread legal revision. More immediately, however, 
the Bolsheviks directed their energies at extracting Russia from the conflict on the 
European continent with all due haste, an urgency which forced the new regime to 
sign the draconian Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The infamous treaty, signed after only 
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two months deliberation, detailed Soviet Russia’s renunciation of obligations to the 
Entente as well as its relinquishment of the Baltic States, Finland, Belarus, and 
Ukraine, while Poland was ignored entirely. The loss of these territories, as well as 
the revolution itself, served as the effective end of the Russian Empire, if only in 
name; in the following years, the Red Army would regain the vast majority of these 
lost lands. In the aftermath of the War in the East, the removal of Soviet Russia 
from the struggle was meant to bring an end to armed conflict in the East, but the 
violence of the First World War continued to plague the entire region for years 
afterward in the form of new conflicts, like the Russian Civil War and the Polish-
Soviet War, as well as the presence of the German Freikorps. Each of these sources 
of conflict would contribute to the social and political makeup of Eastern Europe 
during the Interwar Period. 
 From the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to the coordinated attack on 
Poland in 1939, Eastern Europe endured the Interwar Period to varying degrees of 
independence and unease. While the immediate aftermath of the war was largely 
composed of even more war, by the mid-1920s, the region had mostly settled into 
a tenuous sort of peace. The Polish-Soviet War was perhaps the most significant of 
these post-World War conflicts, having evolved initially out of a border dispute and 
then into an all-out offensive by the Polish Army looking to create an Intermarium, 
or a confederation of states to stand against the great powers of Germany and Soviet 
Russia. The short but brutal conflict ended in Soviet defeat with the signing of a 
treaty in Riga. While the dream of Jozéf Piłsudski, the Polish Chief of State, for an 
Intermarium was never realized, and indeed, all the countries Piłsudski had hoped 
to unite were under Nazi or Soviet control by 1940, the conflict was instrumental 
in curbing Vladimir Lenin’s ambitions to expand communism across the European 
continent. Equally instrumental in the curbing of this ambition was the reality of 
civil war in Soviet Russia. The new government struggled to assert itself across the 
vast stretch of its territory for a full four years before it finally achieved a semblance 
  
of control in 1922. Germany’s post-war experiences were no better, crippled as it 
was by domestic displeasure, abandonment by the elite, and the effects of the Treaty 
of Versailles, which had mandated the removal of German presence from their 
oversea holdings, demilitarization of the Rhineland, payment of reparations to 
Britain and France, and finally, acceptance of responsibility for having initiated the 
war. The effects of these treaty tenets would harden the attitude of the German 
populace into one of resentment and revenge, a sentiment that certain charismatic 
politicians would tap into in the coming decades. Indeed, this reality would only 
exacerbate the pathos of victimhood that had already so colored the experience of 
Germans since the seventeenth century.  With the relentless developments of 
military technology pushing the bounds of what was considered possible, the 
continued occupation of all other European powers in their respective colonial 
holdings, and the failed results of this last episode of frantic administrative 
formulation, the Ober Ost lends itself glaringly to the development of the next stage 
in the German imperial experience.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter Three: The General Government 
 
The Interwar Period, spanning the scant two decades between the conclusion of the 
First World War and the commencement of the Second, was by no means a quiet 
time for Germany, despite the nominal lack of warfare. Having been saddled with 
the unfortunate and unpopular responsibility of negotiating the Treaty of Versailles 
with the victorious Entente, the Social Democrats were hard-pressed to generate 
sympathy or support for the new administration in Weimar. Instead, the party was 
viewed as traitors to the Fatherland who had bowed to the cruelty and exploitation 
of Britain and France and were ultimately, along with women and Jews, the reason 
for Germany’s defeat in the war. This fabricated account of the nation’s defeat, 
known today as the Dolchstosslegende, was largely propagated by those truly 
culpable: the conservative military elite who had so determinedly ignored the 
reality of their situation and thus failed their people. As such, many of these figures 
escaped the consequences of their actions, retaining their heroic reputation, 
particularly in the case of Paul von Hindenburg, Chief of the General Staff from 
1916 to the end of the war. With their support rapidly diminishing in the face of 
continued hardships like the hyperinflation of 1923, the Social Democrats 
eventually yielded to Hindenburg’s still-intact popularity, throwing their support 
with the man’s presidential run in 1925. That year and the following year saw a 
significant reversal in Germany’s political fortunes with the signing of the Locarno 
Treaty, which necessitated friendly relations with France, followed by the 
admittance of Germany into the League of Nations. Yet even these hard-won 
victories could not turn the tide of German sentiment in favor of the Weimar 
Republic.  
 Even as the Social Democrats and their new conservative allies labored to 
rejuvenate the German economy and spirit, the sentiments that had fueled warfare 
and imperialism in previous decades festered in the hearts of ethnic Germans living 
  
outside of the Fatherland. Many of these individuals channeled their frustrations 
and insecurities into rabid nationalism; one such individual was Adolf Hitler. 
Having served in the German Army during WWI, Hitler was well acquainted with 
the sentiments that had so shaped German military culture for decades. It was this 
knowledge that kept Hitler in military service after the war, which led him to join 
the German Workers’ Party in 1919. Over the next four years, Hitler took control 
of the party and, in November of 1923, launched an unsuccessful coup that 
ultimately gave him a platform to project his hyper-nationalistic, anti-Semitic 
message to the whole of Bavaria and beyond. Though held in prison for a year and 
a half, Hitler used the time to dictate his infamous autobiography Mein Kampf, from 
which millions of Germans would draw ideological inspiration in the following 
years. The rhetoric of Mein Kampf, in combination with the discontent of the 
German masses under the effects of the Versailles Treaty, would be exploited over 
the 1920s and 30s to generate further resentment toward Hitler’s chosen scapegoat: 
the Jew. The fueling of this racialized hatred would ultimately evolve into a 
continental civil war and racial war “that combined contemptuous stereotypes of 
long-standing, a loathing of the Bolshevik Revolution, and the wrenching impact 
of World War I and its aftermath, which exacerbated German perceptions of foreign 
dominations and ethic contamination.”48 With Hitler’s rise to the Chancellorship in 
1933, the prospect of a dual war became reality. 
 Once appointed Chancellor of Germany, Hitler’s move to assert total 
control over the German state was startlingly swift. Barely a month after his 
appointment, the Reichstag was set ablaze under mysterious circumstances and 
used to push through the Enabling Act, which granted Hitler widespread 
authoritative power and suspended civil rights for German citizens. This act was 
merely the tipping point that triggered the beginning of the end for German Jews. 
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Anti-Semitism, the centuries-old hatred against the Jewish people that took on 
pseudoscientific racialized qualifiers under the Nazis, was one of two primary 
cornerstones of National Socialist ideology alongside pro-Aryanism. This ideology 
was a virulent mutation of the nineteenth century’s Völkish movement, which 
promoted an organic sense of German essence and, though “often at odds with 
modernity, was fueled by industrialization and social dislocations.”49 In the Nazi 
sense however, the movement took on epically racist overtones that would spawn 
the Nuremburg Laws of 1935, which detailed how Hitler and his myrmidons 
viewed the Volk and the Jewish Question. The Nuremburg Laws were, in fact, the 
second in a series of four collective deaths for German Jews identified by the 
historian Christopher Browning in his book The Origins of the Final Solution.50 In 
his scholarship, Browning points out four separate instances that chip away at the 
rights and freedoms of German Jews living in the Third Reich. The first attack on 
the Jewish people came in 1933, scant months after the passage of the Enabling 
Act, with the clearing of the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil 
Service, which ousted all practicing Jews from government-sponsored jobs, 
becoming the first civic death of German Jewry. The Nuremburg Laws that came 
two years later represented the social death of the Jews, who were no longer 
permitted access to public houses, libraries, theatres, city swimming pools, or even 
simple park benches. Although the signs that had been erected to reinforce these 
laws were quietly tucked away for the 1936 Berlin Olympics, resentment toward 
the Jewish population returned with fervor in 1938 with Kristallnacht, the economic 
attack that destroyed thousands of Jewish homes and businesses in Berlin. The 
final, physical death came with the onslaught of the Einsatzgruppen and the 
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implementation of the Final Solution in January of 1942. Yet for all their 
ideological vitriol toward the Jewish people, the process of developing a broad 
support base for their party was much more concentrated on the latter cornerstone 
of their tenets: pro-Aryanism. 
 Both major pillars of National Socialist ideals rested on a pseudoscientific 
racism that had been developed over the course of previous colonial encounters, yet 
the pillar that mandated exaltation of the “Aryan” people also required careful 
cultivation in order to build popular support with the German people. While the 
concept of an Aryan people initially began as a phenotypical descriptor, the legal 
definition of the term was not granted until the 1935 Nuremburg Laws and the 
mandated creation of the Ahnenpass. Nevertheless, the idea of “Germanness” had 
been in circulation for centuries despite the fact that the unified German state was 
a recent creation of the previous century. German identity had instead been created 
by and survived on a rich collection of folklore that constituted a people’s customs, 
songs, dances, art forms, holidays, heroes, horrors, and language. In conjunction 
with stories, each of these individual components makes up the complete 
compendium of folklore, which remains fluid according to the memories and 
experiences of the community to which it belongs. With such a rich and diverse 
body of folkloric customs already available, the Nazis were able to tap into a potent 
sense of nostalgia to invoke the blessing of Germanic heroes and historical figures 
in order to create a sense of credibility and national heritage. Tales like the Pied 
Piper of Hamelin are a cogent example of the ease with which a story can be 
changed, modified, or misremembered. Without a written canon, the plot, 
characters, and, most importantly, lesson can vary widely from version to version, 
even to the extent of shifting characters from villain to hero and vice versa. While 
not initially a startling prospect, the ability of folkloric fairytales to shift meaning 
is highly troubling when considering that folklore is, at its root, a reflection of a 
community’s values and history. To this end, the National Socialists of Germany 
  
capitalized on the preexisting body of folklore in German-speaking regions to 
create a false narrative of ethnic consciousness and cultural identity that extended 
beyond the border of Germany by dictating who could claim heritage with this 
identity and who could not.   
 Ideological pillars aside, the Nazis’ early energy was poured purposely and 
carefully into dismantling and defying the hated tenets of Versailles, all in an effort 
to rally popular support and prepare Germany for the war that would launch it into 
global hegemony. Initially, Hitler and his myrmidons worked quietly and subtly to 
rearm the military and reintroduce conscription. Then, in 1936, the Nazis moved 
openly to remilitarize the Rhineland, a direct contravention of one of the major 
Versailles provisions. Only two years later, Hitler flouted yet another of the major 
clauses of the treaty with the Anschluss of Austria in March of 1938 and the 
annexation of the Sudetenland later that year. Although both Britain and France 
objected to such actions as contrary to Versailles, neither country was willing to 
back up their displeasure with arms. Despite what historians of today would call 
ample warning, the Nazis were left to pursue their coveted Lebensraum, land 
sufficient for the needs of ethnic Germans, by negotiating a Non-Aggression Pact 
with the Soviet Union that ultimately spawned the Second World War. On 
September 1, 1939, the German and Soviet armies launched separate, coordinated 
assaults on the Polish nation, rapidly dividing and conquering the country in five 
short weeks. With Poland’s invasion and partition completed, the Nazis initiated a 
harsh system of elimination that targeted the Polish elite, including military 
officers, priests, intellectual figures, and political and aristocratic leaders. Such an 
attack was, as Shelley Baranowski asserted in Nazi Empire, “an ideologically 
motivated total war aimed at the destruction of the Polish nation.”51 Nazi soldiers 
were not the only ones to engage in this slaughter. Soviet officers also targeted 
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Polish nationalists in a massacre now named for the forest in which many of the 
mass graves were later discovered: Katyn. The consequences of France and 
Britain’s willful ignorance of the danger presented by Nazi Germany would collude 
the West in the deaths of millions of innocent people across the globe. 
 The Nazi drive to the East was an ideologically motivated ambition, crafted 
and honed by centuries of German concepts and imaginings about Eastern Europe. 
The idea of divide and conquer within the Polish lands was not a new one, neither 
in terms of concept, as explored within the colonial holdings of the Kaiserreich, nor 
location, as evidenced by the 1915 proposal Land ohne Menschen that cleaved to 
the idea of a German colonial destiny in the East.52 Therefore, “the Nazis were thus 
certainly not the first German nationalists to think of radical solutions for the Polish 
problem through colonization and expulsion.”53 Yet even as German nationalists 
idealized and romanticized the vast possibilities for prosperity in the East, the 
people who already lived there were viewed with a disparagement that bordered 
them on subhuman. As during World War I, invading German soldiers felt that they 
had entered a land devoid of recognizable culture, but whereas the soldiers of WWI 
had resolved to build up Eastern culture to German “standards,” the soldiers of 
WWII resolved to expel, enslave, or exterminate the many distinct ethnic groups 
that called the vast region of Eastern Europe home. Since much of the mythology 
surrounding German ideas about Eastern Europe were based on tales from the 
Teutonic Knights and the German immigrants who settled there in the Middle Ages, 
the Nazis established a German Ethnic Registry constructed of four classification 
to distinguish those of sufficient “Germanness” by applying a complicated range of 
“linguistic, anthropological, eugenic, and political criteria, whereby hereditary 
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health, political activism on behalf of German causes, fluency in the German 
language, and other cultural markers…resulted in the highest ranking.”54  
As with nearly every angle adopted by the Nazis, the Registry did not initially enjoy 
a smooth implementation but rather was introduced piecemeal through multiple ad 
hoc committees in different regions over nearly a year and a half. This system of 
ethnic ranking showed just how different the coming occupation of Eastern Europe 
would be than the previous enterprise. This time there would be no Germanization 
of the indigenous peoples; instead those whose “German blood could be extracted 
from the human residue that remained from the medieval German migrations and 
the conquests of the Hanseatic traders and Teutonic Knights” would return to the 
Reich to wash away any remaining Slavism while those who were deemed 
otherwise would be left to work, starve, or be expelled.55 There would soon prove 
to be far more of the latter. 
 The organization of Eastern Europe under the Nazi Regime involved the 
implementation of a policy plan known as Generalplan Ost, which called for the 
ethnic cleansing of Eastern Europe to prepare it for colonization by ethnic Germans. 
Combining the ideologies of Lebensraum with Drang nach Osten, the plan was 
never fully utilized during the war due to Germany’s defeat; however, millions of 
civilian deaths can still be attributed to its earlier Kleine Planung. This first version 
of the plan, to be carried out while invasion was underway, called for the removal 
of several million people from the Baltic states, whose political lines would be 
subsequently wiped out. In order to conduct their racial war in the East, Germany 
employed the use of not only the Wehrmacht but also special tasks forces called the 
Einsatzgruppen and auxiliary police battalions, which “emerged as capable 
instruments of annihilation…[as well as] proved equally important in the 
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subjugation and governance of the areas under German civil administration.”56  
Once an occupation force had been established in Poland, the systematic institution 
of requisitioning land, labor, and resources began with the annihilation of political, 
military, and religious figures in an attempt to stamp out the carriers of Polish 
nationalism. Following this atrocity, the occupiers turned their focus to rounding 
up the Jews and shunting them into hastily established urban ghettos or massacring 
them outright in forests, ravines, and ditches, a prospect made easier by “the belief 
held by the Wehrmacht and SS commanders alike that all Jews were communists 
and partisans.”57 In tandem with this belief were the brutal reprisals put in place by 
the Nazi occupation forces, which designated that any Pole caught aiding or 
abetting a Jew would be put to death, a decree which existed nowhere else in the 
whole of Nazi-occupied Europe. This early part of the war in the East, which was 
characterized by mass executions like the one at Babi Yar in September of 1941, in 
which more than 33,000 Jews were put to death, was poorly documented and 
largely only remembered by the soldiers who carried them out or, as once again in 
the case of Babi Yar, unauthorized photographers like Johannes Hähle.58 Yet as the 
war ground on, Nazi elites began to search in earnest for a more economical method 
of murder. 
 The entrance of America into the war and the army’s failure to put a quick 
end to the Soviet menace led Hitler’s myrmidons to gather at the villa at Wannsee 
in January of 1942 to determine a more efficient approach to genocide. The 
infamous conference lasted all of ninety minutes, during which the fifteen members 
present, who “represented the SS and police bodies, the NSDAP, a number of 
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ministries and the occupying administrations in the areas of Eastern Europe under 
German rule,” determined the fate of Europe’s remaining Jewish population.59 
These fifteen members, headed by Reinhard Heydrich and Adolf Eichmann, vowed 
to give their unconditional support to the new Final Solution to the Jewish Question. 
This solution accounted for the treatment of all Jews within Europe, from full-
blooded practicing Jews to the children of second-degree Mischlinge. Those found 
to be sufficiently German would be welcomed as full members of the Reich, while 
those who were not were to be summarily executed in concentration camps via 
exhaustion, starvation, exposure, or disease. Although “freedom through work” had 
initially been held as the primary method of extermination, the assassination of the 
Conference’s chief architect, Reinhard Heydrich, by Czech partisans in June of that 
year instigated the creation of the Aktion Reinhard death camps, whose sole 
function would be the immediate execution of incoming prisoners. From 1942 until 
late in 1944, the Final Solution was worked out “over pits, in gas vans, and at the 
death facilities at Chełmno, Bełźec, Sobibór, Treblinka, Majdanek, and 
Auschwitz.”60 The creation of the Final Solution is sometimes referred to the 
“twisted path to Auschwitz,” and indeed it aptly underlines the radical 
improvisation so unique to German imperialism, wherein the method and the means 
are often obscured until administrators arrive at it. While Auschwitz remains the 
darkest shadow of the Holocaust with the highest death toll, its infamy lies in part 
due to the simple fact that it remains standing. Unlike the death camps of Sobibór, 
Treblinka, and Bełżec, Auschwitz never stopped running until the Red Army was 
nearly at its doorstep. The three Reinhard camps had completed their assigned task; 
there were no more lives left to end. 
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 By 1944, it was clear that Nazi Germany was on the run, being driven back 
across the territories it had stolen by the combined might of the Red Army and the 
Western Allies. Yet even as the Wehrmacht and its auxiliary entities retreated, the 
bloody work of the Holocaust was not abandoned. Instead, marginal concentration 
camps were emptied in anticipation of enemy liberation, where “their inmates were 
either killed, allowed to die on pointless death marches or herded into other camps 
inside the Reich, where overcrowding, overwork, the lack of supplies, disease and 
the brutality of the guards soon caused the mortality rate to soar.”61 It was this final 
stage that saw the Nazi war machine at its most destructive, bloodily sputtering 
across its now lost territories while cannibalizing itself as the doctrines it was built 
upon came crashing down. Had the Reich not been beaten back across Europe, the 
final stage of the Generalplan Ost would have been realized in the starvation, 
ejection, and enslavement of some thirty million Slavs so that the final dream of 
the Nazi Empire might be realized: Germanization of the East.  
The determination to adopt both the Generalplan Ost and the resolution of 
the Wannsee Conference marked the greatest divergence from the precedent set by 
occupation during World War I, which had always stopped far short of outright 
systematic extermination, and even colonialism in Southwest Africa. This time, 
Eastern occupation came to resemble the even older imperial precedent set by the 
continent of Europe as a whole, despite a new record of cruelty being set with the 
first mass gassings of European Jews by the regional leader of Western Poland.62 It 
was toward this ultimatum that every aspect of the imperialist genocide enacted 
throughout Eastern Europe was driven, based on the claims of scientific racism, the 
ancient promise of a blood bond with the soil, and the draw of the Eastern 
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breadbasket as the Nazis plundered and razed Eastern Europe in the drive toward 
commerce, civilization, and community.  
 The terrible, grinding, bleeding horror of the European Theatre finally 
ended with the suicide of Adolf Hitler and the capitulation of Germany just days 
later. The whole of the war had claimed the lives of sixty million people in total, 
three percent of the planet, including not just soldiers but also untold millions of 
innocent civilians. It represents the deadliest conflict in human history and the first 
time in which a global trial was held to determine the punitive culpability of the 
survivors. These trials, held in the same city that had seen the birth of the first 
formal racial laws of the regime, lasted nearly a full year and tried only twenty-four 
of the highest ranking remaining Nazi elite, including Hermann Göring. Although 
the trials represented one of the best moments of cooperation among the Allies, 
tensions between the capitalist West and the communist East would soon prove 
more lasting. By 1948, the capitol city of Berlin had been partitioned between East 
and West with the rest of the country soon to succeed. More than forty years of 
division would follow, during which the two sides of Germany would advance in 
very different ways and at rates that would ultimately stunt their ability to properly 
deal with their legacy of racism and genocide. While the memory of Nazi Germany 
occupies the vast majority of modern recollections surrounding German history, 
Germany’s legacy of genocide and imperialism stretches back far beyond 1933. 
The experiences of the Herero and Nama under colonial rule, as well as the people 
of Eastern Europe who endured abuse during World War I, demand the right to be 
recognized and assigned their proper significance, yet their struggles have been all 
but forgotten in the shadow of the Third Reich. Of these three cases of German 
imperialism, only two carry the label of genocide, but the suffering experienced by 
the victims of all three exhibit common factors of racial aggression, economic 
exploitation, and territorial expansion that reject the idea that any part of history 
can exist in isolation of the whole. Indeed, the presence of Germany’s obsession 
  
with creating a nationalism based on race, its awareness of the actions of its 
neighbors, its phrenetic attempts to make up laws as it operated, and its wanton use 
of industrial might to manufacture genocide are more obvious in this case than in 
any other, yet their presence is still noteworthy. The differences between Southwest 
Africa, the Ober Ost, and the General Government are salient to say the least, but 
so too, perhaps even more so, are their terrible similarities. 
  
  
Conclusion 
 
In attempting to draw conclusions from the connections between the Kaiserreich’s 
actions in Southwest Africa, the Ober Ost enterprise, and the Nazi Reich’s General 
Government campaign, certain subtle and obvious correlations must be 
acknowledged and assessed. Each of these cases are uniquely German for reasons 
that can be boiled down to four primary factors: pathos, frantic improvisation, 
cognizance of contemporaries, and industrial modernity. Since the Thirty Years 
War, ethnic Germans have struggled with a complex of victimhood that only gained 
strength under the rule of Napoleon and the failures of 1848. Coupling this fear of 
exploitation by their neighbors with the insecurity of their sense of nationalism, 
Germany pursued an anxious need to conquer or be conquered, which lent itself 
directly to the frantic improvisation that developed in all three cases of imperialism. 
This sense of needing to “catch up” promoted the radical violence that became 
characteristic of German occupation, which differed so drastically in execution 
from Britain’s vaunted “indirect rule” and even from other nations’ use of “direct 
rule.” As such, Germany was far from ignorant of its neighbors’ imperial tactics. 
Indeed, their desire to keep pace with Britain and France in particular can also be 
connected to Germany’s late arrival to the international scene and its desire to be 
considered a leading player in global politics and trade. In all three cases, German 
administrators took notes from their contemporaries and incorporated them into 
their own plans that simultaneously fulfilled their desire to secure their national 
identity, while also relied on the massive power of their fully industrialized modern 
state. This final factor, Germany’s industrial might, is one that often receives far 
too little attention yet is necessary to understanding the magnitude of violence 
created by the concerns of the first three factors. Each of these elements combine 
and overlap to create a picture of imperialism that is unique to the German 
  
experience and the primary contributors to creating the genocide that characterized 
Nazi occupation in the East.  
While each case also exhibits certain degrees of the shared themes of 
genocide coined by Kiernan, it is important to note that only two of the three 
actually qualify for such a moniker. Despite their differences in geography and 
regime, both the Herero Genocide and the Holocaust employed racism as a 
quantifiable branch of science, able to be proven through anatomical 
measurements, and relied on a cult of antiquity to lend legitimacy to their claims 
for nationhood and existence. Additionally, neither case wasted time building 
schools, hospitals, or new missionaries in either dominated territory, as the single 
goal was the conversion of the land to a Germanized agrarian state, possible only 
through aggressive expansionism at the price of the racially inferior as dictated by 
the norms established by antiquity. Meanwhile, the edicts of the Ober Ost also 
exhibited influence from these various themes, whether it was in the culturally 
dismissive attitude of the Deutsche Arbeit program or the idolization of the image 
of the Teutonic Knight who had fought along these same battle lines in centuries 
long past. Yet this chapter of German imperialism was not one that told a story of 
genocide. Whereas the General Government and Southwest Africa both rejected 
the establishment of buildings and programs that might have aided the native 
populace, the Ober Ost did in fact strive to promote schools, theatre, and the media. 
The differences therefore, between each of the cases, are just as salient as their 
similarities. Each stage in German imperialism represents a different perspective 
and interpretation of the goals to be pursued and the paths to be taken in this pursuit. 
By recognizing these subtle and obvious connections, both in terms of unifying and 
defining characteristics, one can become more adept at recognizing situations in 
which violence and destruction are imminent. 
To be sure, the themes of imperialism and genocide are far from the only 
commonalities at play between these three cases. In fact, all three share key figures 
  
in their related events. The father of Nazi leader Hermann Göring, who served as a 
fighter pilot in World War I, acted as the Reichskommissar of German Southwest 
Africa, while the future Nazi governor of Bavaria, Franz Ritter, was directly 
involved in the genocide of the Herero and Nama peoples. Future rector of the 
University of Berlin during the Nazi Regime, Eugen Fischer “carried out his 
racialist research in German Southwest Africa, on miscegenation among the mixed 
Dutch/Hottentot ‘Rehoboth Bastards.”63 During his time at the University, Fischer 
was responsible for supporting the pseudoscience that would later compose the 
research of the infamous Josef Mengele. This sharing of culpable figures resulted 
also in the shared usage of language when referring to those deemed “unclean,” 
“uncivil,” or “savage.” But perhaps one of the most interesting correlations between 
each case is the perpetuity of the German victim complex first established by the 
outcome of the Thirty Years’ War. This complex would be strengthened by their 
later defeat at the hands of Napoleon and their failure to unify in 1848. Having been 
constantly overshadowed and overpowered by their more puissant neighbors, 
Germans began to cultivate a need for strength in numbers via unification. In order 
to defend that unification, there came the drive to conquer or be conquered, as 
evidenced by their almost immediate involvement in colonial enterprises in order 
to measure up to their French and British rivals. But this desire would ultimately 
bring ruin as the outcomes of the Great War, from the starvation wrought on the 
German people and the various uprisings in Hamburg and Berlin to the 
psychological and political effects of the Treaty of Versailles and fabricated 
Stabbed in the Back myth. Each of these factors combined to create an atmosphere 
of anger, fear, and suspicion toward fellow Germans and especially toward foreign 
powers so that when a new regime rose in Germany that promised to rectify the 
mistakes of past eras by citing the culpability of Jews and the belief that too much 
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effort “had been lavished on cultivating essentially unchangeable native 
populations and close contact with the East had infected the morale of the 
occupiers,” it became clear that this new Nazi era would be drawing on examples 
closer to Southwest Africa rather than their last failed attempt to cultivate the East.64 
This desire to make room for those of good or malleable ethnic background was 
only relinquished after the defeat and partition of Germany following World War 
II.  
But such a legacy of expansion and slaughter cannot simply be ignored or 
erased in a single day. Even now, over seventy years after their last imperial 
conquest, Germany is still struggling to come to terms with its past and its future, 
and it is far from the only nation to struggle to do so. In order to mitigate the 
difficulty of the various imperial European powers, the United Nations (U.N.) first 
concentrated on the most obvious form of imperialism: the criminalization of 
genocide. For all that genocide has occurred many times over the course of human 
history, the term itself is actually not yet a century old. Instead, it was coined during 
the Second World War by Polish-Jewish lawyer Raphael Lemkin who witnessed 
the systematic destruction of his people and understood it to be far more than an act 
of war. Lemkin’s definition qualified genocide as the destruction of the political 
and social structure of culture, language, nationality, religion, and economy as well 
as the destruction of personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and physical life. 
Although his definition was eventually rejected and modified, his efforts were 
instrumental in organizing the U.N.’s Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the 1948. This convention was pivotal in 
establishing a precedent for justice within international courts, based on the opening 
of the resolution which stated how “recognizing that at all periods of history 
genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity; and being convinced that, in order 
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to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, international co-operation is 
required.”65 In part due to the sheer magnitude of the atrocity and also the 
inclination toward activism with regards to European brutality, the definition of 
genocide was established alongside a universal declaration of human rights in that 
same year, which stated that “whereas disregard and contempt for human rights 
have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, 
and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech 
and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest 
aspiration of the common people.”66 Ignoring the inherent ironies of realizing such 
human standards only in retrospect to a largely European humanitarian disaster, the 
efforts of the U.N. to quantify such a crime and attach added significance to it were 
commendable, and while they have been largely unsuccessful in preventing 
genocide, recognition for the crime has certainly increased. In tandem with this 
increased awareness is heightened recognition of the need for acknowledgement of 
and reparations for the damage wrought by non-genocidal imperial ventures. 
Although this has been slow in coming, the process of decolonization grinds on 
with each year as more nations return to autonomous rule, for better or worse. 
While decolonization has experienced continuous if slow success, the 
understanding of how and why these imperial ventures came about is less so, 
particularly in the case of the Nazi Holocaust. The dangers of ignoring the 
commonalities between different eras and empires are vast. To disregard these 
similarities is to blindly believe that humanity always accounts for its actions and 
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learns from its mistakes, yet this is glaringly untrue. At the same time, ignorance of 
the unifying factors of genocide and empire is not always the culprit behind the 
rejection of such; instead, perhaps one of the largest dangers to the integration of 
the Nazi Holocaust into the global narrative lies in the ideas promoted by figures 
like Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, whose misleading theories serve to undermine his 
own efforts to draw attention to the problem of violence based on race and religion. 
A former associate professor of government at Harvard University, Goldhagen is 
the author of the controversial 1996 work Hitler’s Willing Executioners. Despite 
the lack of historical background, Goldhagen’s book works to create a new concept 
of eliminationist anti-Semitism, which claims that all ethnic Germans in the 
generations preceding World War II were virulently anti-Semitic and thus desirous 
of the complete eradication of the Jewish people. By arguing that “the perpetrators 
approved of the mass slaughter, that they willingly gave assent to their participation 
in the slaughter, is certain [and] that their approval derived in the main from their 
conception of Jews is all but certain, for no other source of motivation can plausibly 
account for their actions,” Goldhagen’s argument becomes simply ahistorical and 
dangerous.67 Anti-Semitism had unfortunately been a matter of course in Europe 
since the adoption of Christianity by the Roman Empire, yet Germany was in fact 
the land in which Jews had experienced the most social and civic freedoms, 
allowing them to flourish in another Renaissance of their own making. To assert 
that Germany was a land of rabid anti-Semites, therefore, is a blunt myth. Of course, 
it existed, but not to any exceptional degree in comparison with any other European 
nation. Moreover, Goldhagen’s deliberate distinction between ethnic Germans and 
non-ethnic Germans as perpetrators and Jews and non-Jews as victims 
simultaneously erases the complicity of a multitude of occupied European states in 
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the organization and execution of the Holocaust, as well as invalidates the suffering 
and murder of hundreds of thousands of Roma, Sinti, gay men, disabled people, 
and political prisoners, all of whom were targeted for reasons that had little to 
nothing to do with anti-Semitism.  
Even setting aside the obvious ahistorical nature of Goldhagen’s argument, 
his theory also serves to hamstring his effort to underline the horror of the 
Holocaust and the genocide of European Jewry by ignoring other motivational 
factors at play and creating the appearance that genocide can be avoided by simply 
not engaging in anti-Semitic behavior. To reduce the Nazi agenda to a single 
isolated cause is to promote the idea that all cases of genocide must operate in the 
same fashion, as if to say that since the German people are no longer anti-Semitic, 
Hitler will never again kill all the Jews of Europe. To be fair, they are absolutely 
correct, but there is nothing to say that the perpetrator must be Hitler or that the 
victims must be Jews. Yet despite the proliferation of problematic theories like 
Goldhagen’s, the campaign to contextualize the Holocaust is ongoing. Through the 
efforts of historians like Ben Kiernan, the Holocaust has been successfully placed 
within a global history of genocide that lends meaning and legitimacy to other, 
previously ignored cases of horror. However, connecting the Holocaust to its 
imperial neighbors is often less explored and less acknowledged, but in order to 
understand its significance, an understanding of its predecessors is vital. This 
research has attempted to make such connections, not in an effort to mitigate the 
severity of the Holocaust but rather to identify the ideologies and practices that 
contributed to its birth. By recognizing this family tree of imperialism, the idea that 
such acts of horror, be they genocidal or not, are unrepeatable can be successfully 
challenged. Perhaps then humanity can take greater steps towards dismantling 
systems of oppression and exploitation. 
 The existence of these systems, however, is very real and unfortunately 
experiencing a regrowth in recent years. Turkey, Russia, and North Korea are all 
  
led by parties who exercise near or total control of their states, often with blatant 
disregard for the laws of the land. In Turkey, the once popular President Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan has appropriated power with an iron fist through a recent 
referendum that has allowed him “wide control over the judiciary, broad powers to 
make law by decree, the abolition of the office of the Prime Minister and of 
Turkey’s parliamentary system—effectively [making] him a dictator.”68 Even 
before the referendum granted him such widespread power, Erdoğan and his party 
worked to quell the opposition, even going so far as detaining some forty thousand 
people, firing over one hundred thousand government employees, and shutting 
down one hundred and seventy-nine media sources. If these actions sound familiar, 
they should. Not only did Hitler take similar measures in his rise to power, but so 
too did Vladimir Putin, whose views on homosexuality and women’s rights are 
frighteningly archaic. Putin’s actions within foreign affairs have also been 
incredibly militaristic, from his annexation of the Crimean Peninsula to Russian 
support of Syria’s own dictator, Bashar al-Assad. Yet while Putin could be argued 
as not fully qualifying as an authoritarian dictator, the same could not be said for 
North Korea’s Kim Jong-un. Despite being the youngest head of state in the world, 
Kim Jong-un has been responsible for a slew of harsh reprisals against perceived 
coups and rebellions, all the while threatening North Korea’s neighbors and 
enemies with open nuclear warfare. To complete the picture of an authoritarian 
regime, Kim Jong-un has followed in his father and grandfather’s footsteps by 
keeping the country closed off to any foreign presence or media to ensure a purely 
governmental censorship of information. Yet such matters strike much closer to 
home in recent months. Although the United States’ new president, Donald Trump, 
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does not command the same level of control and fear that these three figures wield, 
he has continued to exhibit beliefs and actions that hint at a future similar to Turkey, 
North Korea, or Russia, from his blatant disrespect for minorities to his militant 
approach to foreign relations. In many ways not even fully encompassed by the 
examples already stated, the twenty-first century has already made ripples that 
starkly reflect those created in the previous century. It is those ripples out of which 
I hope to draw meaning. 
 A few weeks ago, in the heart of the summer before the last year of my 
undergraduate education, I sat down to write this conclusion and was faced with 
the task of distilling the last three years of reading and traveling and discussing and 
puzzling and not sleeping into a single cohesive work. I confess I felt outmatched. 
How does one begin to synthesize literally thousands of pages of reading? How 
does one convey the inspiration and revelation of dozens of weeks of discussion? 
How does one instill the overwhelming despair of a concentration camp that, even 
diluted by seventy years of disuse, still brought me to my knees? How does one 
start such a process? And more importantly, where does one end it? To answer how 
a beginning is created, it simply is. You force yourself to sit at the table and open 
your laptop and start typing words until the right ones appear on the page, whether 
they are the first to surface or the seventy-sixth. Endings, however, are much more 
difficult. In some ways, this very paper is an ending, but I hope it is not the end of 
everything. I hope that this research will move forward with me and evolve as my 
own experiences and knowledge undoubtedly will. I hope that in its next form, this 
research will grow to address more than just German imperialism, but European 
imperialism as a whole, while still looking to elucidate and legitimize its legacy. 
But ultimately, the true goal of this research is simply to make the point that the 
events that came before us continue to matter. Whether through advocacy or 
education, ignorance of the past must be brought to heel in order to halt the spread 
of apathy; without understanding, we cannot hope to empathize, for we cannot care 
  
about what we do not understand. Yet if we can find a way, any way, to 
contextualize and clarify the manner and motive that went into different cases of 
horror based on the excuse of land, resources, prestige, or divine duty, then we will 
have made a step towards crippling the future that holds such ends within it. This 
history we share as one people, the human people, must not be forgotten, if for no 
other reason than that we will be doomed to relive it. As for me, I hope to give my 
children a world in which they will never know violence or hatred or genocide in 
the flesh. I hope to give this world to my neighbors’ children and the children of 
those who are not my neighbors. Because humans are not made to hate. They are 
not made to kill. They are made to live. 
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